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Plea Bargaining: The Judicial Merry-Go-Round
INTRODUCTION
The last decade has brought to our courts the increasing awareness
that the criminal is winning the war against crime. He is not winning
through cunning or guile, nor even with the aid of modern technology.
He is winning because the sheer number of his comrades-in-arms is
beginning to buckle our cumbersome system of justice. Realizing the
need to relieve its congested dockets, the courts have resorted to various
methods to expedite the legal process. One of these methods, plea
bargaining, is not designed to accelerate the trial level but instead elimi-
nate it. It has done just that with remarkable efficiency. Unfortunately
the price for a more efficient system of justice is high, and too often
paid by the very individuals who need its protection most. The purpose
of this article is to examine plea bargaining in our courts and assess its
impact upon the judicial system. The analysis will include the role of
the trial judge in the bargaining process, problems involved in with-
drawing a guilty plea, and reasons why the process is used so extensively
today. The dangers of plea bargaining will also be examined in con-
junction with recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions.
The rise of plea bargaining to its present status has not been without
controversy.' Its foes have wielded such verbal weapons as "denial of
due process," and "unethical," which have been successfully countered
by retorts of "necessary" and "efficient." Whatever the future of plea
bargaining may be, one thing must be made absolutely clear-it is
dangerously susceptible to abuse.
PLEA BARGAINING DEFINED
Plea bargaining is a process by which a defendant is induced to plead
guilty for a consideration, and forgo his or her right to trial. Several
questions are raised by this definition. First, what type of inducements
are used? One method is to plead guilty to a lesser offense. For example,
1. See generally, Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt At Social Dissection, 42 YALE
L.J. 1 (1932); Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385
(1951); Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideration: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956); Weintraub and Tough, Lesser Pleas Considered, 32 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 506 (1941); Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on the Judicial Deter-
mination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromise
By Prosecutors To Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
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a person in Pennsylvania charged with assault with intent to maim2 faces
a possible $2,000 fine, five years in solitary confinement, or both. The
accused will be offered a reduced charge of aggravated assault and bat-
tery,3 carrying a $2,000 fine and/or three years imprisonment, or even
simple assault and battery4 consisting of a $1,000 fine and/or two years
imprisonment in return for a plea of guilty. The defendant is not only
assured of receiving a lighter punishment (and a greater probability of
suspended sentence or probation) but also is spared the stigma of a
felony conviction. 5 The penal codes of most states are conducive to this
type of bargaining.6 This amicable arrangement is based on one funda-
mental premise-that the defendant is initially guilty, or from all
indications would have been found guilty, on all charges. This suggests
one of the abuses to which plea bargaining may be subject. If a prose-
cutor desires a conviction, but does not feel the evidence will sustain
one, he merely adds several unwarranted charges to the original ones
in order to give himself some bargaining leverage for a guilty plea. If
this method is used in good faith by the prosecutor, it is most advan-
tageous to the accused. He is assured of a reduced sentence since the
bargain is actually consummated at the arraignment. The problem of
whether the judge will accept a recommendation is not present, and
if the prosecutor does not uphold his end of the bargain, the defendant
will be aware of it before he makes his plea. Any abuses by the prose-
cutor can in most cases be foreseen by the defendant's attorney.
Another inducement is that of recommending to the judge that the
defendant be given a lighter sentence.7 This method is not without its
drawbacks. The accused runs the risk that the prosecutor will neglect
to make the recommendation. s Even if it is made there is always the
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4712 (1963).
3. Id. § 4709.
4. Id. § 4708.
5. A felony conviction is a considerable threat to the recidivist since sentences may be
doubled and even tripled with second and third offenses. See Ohlin & Remington,
Sentencing Structures: Its Effect Upon Systems for the Administration of Criminal Justice,
23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 495 (1958).
6. In New York there are three types of assault: Assault in the third degree (max. 1
year); Assault in the second degree (max. 3 to 7 years); Assault in the first degree (max.
3 to 15 years). N.Y. CONSUL. LAWS ANN. tit. 39, §§ 120.00, 120.05, 120.10 (McKinney 1967).
In Illinois the crime of kidnapping is divided into three categories: Kidnapping (max.
I to 5 years); Aggravated Kidnapping (max.-death); Unlawful Restraint (max. $500 fine,
1 year or both). ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38 §§ 10-1, 10-2, 10-3 (1964).
7. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideration: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. GRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 780, 787 (1956):
This ordinarily occured in cases where the offense in question carried statutory
degrees of severity such as homicide, assault, and sex offenses.
8. Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. 516, 276 A.2d 526 (1971). The prosecutor failed
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possibility that the court may not heed the appeal.9 Studies have shown,
however, that generally the judges do heed these recommendations. One
finding showed that of a group of federal district court judges who
believed the plea relevant in sentencing procedures, 84% indicated that
a defendant pleading guilty would be given a lighter sentence. 10 The
reason for this attitude among judges is the belief that a defendant
pleading guilty is attempting to atone for his wrong, and is thus less
culpable than the accused who flaunts his innocence till the end."
Another theory is that the judge is not prejudiced by the inflamatory
details of the crime given by the prosecutor. 12
It is this latter method which has caused the greatest concern to
liberal legal scholars. Upon initial reflection one envisions the court-
room scene of a soap opera where the assistant district attorney ap-
proaches the hardened criminal and in a tough but compassionate voice
says, "Throw yourself on the mercy of the court and I'll do everything
I can to see the judge goes easy on you." This may have been the birth
of the modern day plea bargain but since then it has developed ramifica-
tions far beyond what was initially intended.
Another problem of importance in relation to plea bargaining is by
whom is it done, and for what reasons? These two questions have been
a source of some consternation within the courts themselves.
In answer to the former question, there is little doubt that the main
ingredient to any bargaining venture is the prosecutor. It is he who sets
the legal machine in motion, and it is he who can put a stop to it or at
least shorten its duration. Due process and the judicially inherent sense
of fair play require that the defense counsel also be present in the
bargain. 13
ROLE OF THE JUDGE
The serious issue revolves around the role of the trial judge. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that "for a judge to make a
bargain, engagement or promise in advance of the hearing of the case
to recommend to the judge as promised that defendant receive life imprisonment instead
of death.
9. Commonwealth v. Banmiller, 193 Pa. Super. 411, 165 .A.2d 121 (1960).
10. Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on the Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956).
11. Id. at 209.
12. Id. at 218.
13, Cases have arisen involving instances where bargains have been made to defendants
without their being represented by counsel. See Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101
(5th Cir. 1957).
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irrespective of what the evidence might thereafter show the facts to be
and as to what judgment he should render therein, would be judicial
misconduct. 14 The opinion goes on, however, to note by way of
dictum that in the future, should a judge happen to discuss the disposi-
tion of a case with counsel for one side, he had better be sure the coun-
sel for the opposing side is present.15
In 1966, the court gave its unofficial seal of approval to plea bar-
gaining in Commonwealth ex. rel. Kerekes v. Maroney. 6 Citing United
States ex. rel. McGrath v. LaVallee,17 however, it qualified that ap-
proach with a veil of judicial rhetoric giving the concession an air of
constitutional respectability.
Our concept of due process must draw a distinct line between, on
the one hand, advice and "bargaining" between defense and prose-
cuting attorneys and, on the other hand, discussions by judges who
are ultimately to determine the length of the sentence imposed.' 8
More recently the case of Commonwealth v. Evans19 came before the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Citing Kerekes,20 the majority again
announced that any participation by the trial judge in a plea bargain
is forbidden. 2' The reasons given by the court were first, that defendant
will get the impression that he would not receive a fair trial if in fact
he chose to have one. Secondly, the judge will not be able to objectively
consider the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Thirdly, the defendant,
not wanting to raise the ire of the judge, may plead guilty despite his
alternative desires.2 2 One federal court stated the problems in these
terms:
14. Commonwealth v. Senauskas, 326 Pa. 69, 71, 191 A. 167, 168 (1937). See also Com-
monwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964) where the court held that defendant
was entitled to withdraw his plea where defense counsel claimed one judge of a three-
judge court had made a commitment against the death penalty which defendant had re-
lied upon.
15. Commonwealth v. Senauskas, 326 Pa. 69, 71, 191 A.2d 167, 168 (1937).
16. 423 Pa. 337, 349, 223 A.2d 699, 705 (1966):
While we are not willing to completely proscribe plea bargaining, we do recognize
that the awesome effect of a guilty plea and the sensitive nature of the bargaining
process makes certain safeguards essential.
17. 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion).
18. 423 Pa. 337, 349, 223 A.2d 699, 705 (1966).
19. 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969).
20. Id. at 54, 252 A.2d at 690.
21. The court cites Informal Opinion No. 779, A.B.A., Professional Ethics Committee:
A judge should not be a patty to advance arrangements for the deterimination of sentence,
whether as a result of a guilty plea or a finding of guilty based on proof. A.B.A. MINI-
MUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Pleas of Guilty, § 3.3 (Tent. Draft, February, 1967).
22. Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 54, 252 A.2d 689, 690 (1969). See 8 DuQ. L. REv.
461 (1970).
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The unequal positions of the judge and the accused, one with
the power to commit to prison and the other deeply concerned to
avoid prison, at once raise a question of fundamental fairness.
When a judge becomes a participant in plea bargaining he brings
to bear the full force and majesty of his office. His awesome power
to impose a substantially longer or even maximum sentence in
excess of that proposed is present whether referred to or not. A
defendant needs no reminder that if he rejects the proposal, stands
upon his rights to trial and is convicted, he faces a significantly
longer sentence. 23
Dissenting in the Evans case, Justice Bell takes a more pragmatic
view.24 Since the judge is going to hear the recommendations from
the district attorney in any event, he should be a party to the con-
ference from its inception. Not only would the process be brought
into the open, away from "chicanery, partiality, politics or compul-
sion, ' 25 but it also would expedite litigation and help to relieve the
great backlog of criminal cases. 26 Perhaps realizing what he has sug-
gested in his dissent is not totally in line with a system of justice based
upon due process of law, Bell states "parenthetically" in a footnote
that "the law is well settled that a trial Judge is not bound by any
agreement between the defense counsel and the district attorney that
if a guilty plea is entered, the district attorney will agree to or will
recommend a specific sentence, nor would he be bound even if he had
participated in the conference. 27 What the Justice is objecting to is
the abolition of the long standing practice in Pennsylvania for the
trial judge to be present but not actively participate in a plea bargain.
He fails to recognize that the judge's participation in the bargaining
process has a dramatic impact upon the defendant. Whether the de-
fendant believes that the judge is participating in the actual decision or
not is irrelevant, since he does believe that the judge must have acqui-
esced in the final determination. The fact the judge makes a special
point, before the plea is given, to inform the accused that he, as judge,
is in no way bound by the recommendations is also of little importance.
It appears to the defendant that this is done purely for the sake of
judicial propriety.
23. United States ex. rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
24. Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 57, 252 A.2d 689, 692 (1969).
25. Id. at 57, 252 A.2d at 692.
26. Justice Bell pointed out that as of April 1, 1969, the criminal courts of Philadelphia
County had a backlog of 284 untried homicide cases, at least 50% of which should be
disposed of by plea bargaining. Id. at 58, 252 A.2d at 692.
27. Id. at 58 n.0, 252 A.2d at 692 n.0.
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In analyzing the court's position, it can be seen that the Justices
are divided between their duty to insure every defendant his con-
stitutional right to a trial by jury,28 in accordance with due process,29
and recognition that something must be done to relieve the great con-
gestion of pending criminal cases. The solution offered is that under
no circumstances may a judge participate or be bound by a plea bargain,
however, in the interest of expediency he should consider any such
agreements made between the prosecution and the defense. It is sub-
mitted that although this may be a laudable compromise, it may in
fact handicap both interests. This amicable agreement between the
two attorneys and the defendant, coupled with a judicial wink from the
court, may be subject to some very fundamental abuses of judicial
propriety and fair play.
COMMONWEALTH V. WILKINS
In some instances the plea bargain attempt may serve to even further
delay the system it was meant to expedite. The case of Commonwealth
v. Wilkins"O displayed both the confusion and failure of purpose to
which plea bargaining is susceptible. The defendant in this instance
was indicted in a purse snatching case, for assault and battery, assault
with intent to rob, and robbery.3' There seemed little doubt that
Wilkins was the one involved since he was identified both by the victim,
and by a card with his name on it found in the victim's hand bag when
it was returned. This in itself says something about the defendant's
ability to make a rational judgment as to the significance of a plea
bargain.3 2 These factors coupled with the defendant's prior juvenile
record led the defense counsel and prosecutor to the conclusion that
there was little chance for acquittal. They suggested to Wilkins that
if he pleaded guilty, the Commonwealth would recommend a sentence
of from eleven and one-half to twenty-three months on the robbery
bill, and a year's probation on the assault and battery bill. Apparently,
Wilkins facing a possible term of twelve years imprisonment,33 decided
28. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI & VII.
29. Id. amend. XIV.
30. 442 Pa. 524, 277 A.2d 341 (1971).
31. In Pennsylvania, the charges of assault with intent to rob, and robbery, should be
combined under the heading Robbery and Robbery by Assault and Force, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4704 (1963).
32. The -possibility that the victim was mistaken in her identification and that Wilkins
had been framed by the real assailant was not pursued.
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4704 (1963), Robbery and Robbery by Assault and Force
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under the circumstances to accept the bargain. Before making his
plea, defendant made a statement to the court that he was promised
nothing and that he fully understood the nature of the offense against
him, and that he "could be sent away . . . for a long time."34 At that
time the prosecuting attorney made his recommendation at a side bar
conference but no such recommendation ever appeared on the record.
Due to the preparation of the pre-sentence report, a sentence was not
actually handed down till four months later. A different prosecuting
attorney was assigned to the sentence hearing who had only a vague
notion of a recommendation which had been made in behalf of defen-
dant. The judge also had forgotten the recommendation which was
never again brought to his attention. Wilkins was then sentenced to
eighteen months to fifteen years on the robbery charge.3 5 Suggestions
of shorter minimum sentences were offered by both the defense counsel
and the prosecution, but never was the specific recommendation made
as promised. Upon appeal, it was discovered that defendant had been
"coached" by the two attorneys into telling the judge that he had been
promised nothing and that his plea was voluntarily made. 36
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in accordance with the major-
ity of states,3 7 held that a defendant may withdraw8 a plea of guilty
when a promise to recommend a lenient sentence is not kept by the
prosecutor. 39 For a trial judge to rule any other way would be an abuse
carries a ten year maximum sentence; Id. § 4708 (1971), Assault and Battery carries a two
year maximum sentence.
34. Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 442 Pa. 524, 526, 277 A.2d 341, 342 (1971).
35. The fifteen year maximum is five years longer than is allowed by state law. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4704 (1963), Robbery and Robbery by Assault and Force carries a ten
year maximum sentence.
36. Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 442 Pa. 524, 529-30, 277 A.2d 341, 343-44 (1971). Upon
post-conviction hearing, defendant, upon interrogation by his own counsel, stated:Q. Did they tell you anything about how you should respond to the question the
judge would present before the court? Now, specifically, when the judge said, 'Are
you doing this voluntarily or have any promises been made to you' did they tell you
how to answer those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. What did they tell you to say?
A. They told me I was being asked, and when asked was there any deal or bargain-
ing made I was to say, no.
37. Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. 516, 522, 276 A.2d 526, 529 (1971). Decisions
among the majority which allow a change of plea for a broken promise: White v. Gaffney,
455 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1970); People v. Fratianno, 6 Cal. App. 3d 211, 85 Cal. Rptr.
755 (1970); State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 160, N.W.2d 146 (1968); People v. Sigafus,
39 Ill. 2d 68, 233 N.E.2d 386 (1968); State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).
Decisions among the minority which do not allow a change of plea for a broken promise:
People v. Chadwick, 33 App. Div. 2d 687, 306 N.YS.2d 182 (1969); Courtney v. State, 341
P.2d 610 (Okla. Ct. App. 1959).
38. See Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 247-48, 202 A.2d 521, 536 (1964) for
general propositions as to when withdrawal is or is not legally justifiable.
39. Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 442 Pa. 524, 529, 277 A.2d 341, 343 (1971); See also
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of discretion. More importantly the court stated that a shy recommenda-
tion to the trial judge at side bar would not be sufficient in upholding
the Commonwealth's end of the bargain. Any recommendation must
be made audibly to the court and placed on record. 40 The court went
on to note:
In the future, if a defendant or his counsel wish to protect a
bargain they received for a plea, when the court asks the defendant
if any promises were made to him, the defendant should answer in
the affirmative, stating that the district attorney's office promised
that they would make the specific recommendation which had,
in fact, been promised. The court should then make it clear to the
defendant that he is not bound by the district attorney's recom-
mendation and at that time allow that defendant to plead guilty
or go to trial. 41
SLLiones wrote a dissenting opinion 2 in which he attempted to
correct the court on one important point. When a defendant pleads
guilty, whether he has been promised anything or not, he presumably
is admitting his complicity in the crime he has been charged with. It
is anomolous to later allow him to withdraw that plea. After all, a man is
either guilty or he is not. The only change that should be made
according to the Justice is to allow the recommendation (eleven and
one-half to twenty-three months) to to take the place of the actual
sentence of eighteen months to fifteen years. He also concurs with the
majority but adds:
Whenever a trial judge is informed by the accused of a desire to
plead guilty, any proposed bargains should be brought to light
before a guilty plea is entered. At that juncture, the judge may
take evidence if he believes that concessions are unwarranted. If
the judge then concludes he will not follow the agreement he
should then so inform the accused before receiving any guilty
plea.43
From August, 1967 when Wilkins was indicted to May 14, 1971
when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided the case, was a
period of almost four years which Wilkins spent in prison. He went
Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. 516, 276 A.2d 526 (1971); Commonwealth v. Scoleri,
415 Pa. 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964); Commonwealth v. Todd, 186 Pa. Super. 272, 142 A.2d 174
(1958).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 532, 277 A.2d at 345.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 535, 277 A.2d at 346-47.
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through an indictment, trail court, sentence hearing, post-conviction
hearing, an appeal to the Superior Court and one to the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania only to find out that he must start all over at the trial
level. He has cost himself and the state taxpayers hundreds of dollars
for a crime amounting to a few dollars. All of this because of a desire
to expedite litigation.
If the theory of the dissenting Justice in the Wilkins case is fol-
lowed, the trial judge must inform the defendant whether or not he
intends to follow the recommendation before the guilty plea is en-
tered. 44 Although this eliminates the "casino-like game of chance, ' 45 it
brings about a most unconscionable situation. If the bargain is rejected,
the guilty defendant will plead innocent, thus frustrating the purpose
of the entire process. And if the bargain is accepted, it is submitted that
the innocent defendant will be as coerced into pleading guilty as if
he had been rubberhosed at the station house. This is especially true
where the accused is offered probation or a suspended sentence. Even
an innocent man will plead guilty and insure his freedom, rather than
chance imprisonment after a conviction based on circumstantial evi-
dence.46 Although he has retained his freedom, he will be plagued for
the rest of his life by the black mark of a felony conviction.
REASONS FOR ITS USE
In order to scrutinize the process of plea bargaining, the reasons
why it is done must be further explored. This entails two points of
view, one from the side of the accusor (i.e., prosecuting attorney, judge
and society), and the other from the accused. Both can be summarized
by one word-expediency.
The accusor is interested in plea bargaining primarily because of the
circumstances first mentioned in the comment-the fact that it is be-
coming more and more difficult for a system of justice based upon due
process for all to stem the tide of an ever increasing crime rate. One
author wrote:
44. Id. at 529, 277 A.2d at 343.
45. Id. at 533, 277 A.2d at 346.
46. Justice Roberts in defending plea bargaining made this statement:
Even when the evidence, although not overwhelming, is more than sufficient to
sustain a conviction, it may well be in the defendant's best interest to plead guilty
rather than to gamble and lose, when losing may result in the deprivation of liberty
for an extended period of time or the death sentence.
Commonwealth v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 348, 223 A.2d 699, 705 (1966).
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When a system is threatened by offenders demanding full, for-
mal adjudication of their cases, it faces the alternatives of either
not adjudicating many serious offenders or requiring greatly in-
creased staff and other facilities. The former is not possible; the
latter probably unrealistic. Particularly is this so when there is a
known way of conforming to currently-acceptable objectives, with
a relatively modest expenditure of time and money. This can be
done by operating the system in a way that will encourage a large
number of pleas of guilty.47
To be more specific, a number of reasons are given for the use and
encouragement of plea bargaining by the accusor. For example, it is
suggested as an aid in decreasing the number of trials.48 This in turn
will relieve the long term incarceration of some persons waiting trial.49
Less facilities will be needed and thus fewer state employees to absorb
taxes.5° Also, defense counsels will not be spread so thin, and thus be
better able to prepare for their client's cases. -51 When confronted with
the constitutional perils of plea bargaining, its supporters will state that
if the proper safeguards are maintained, the right of the accused will
never be threatened. The most important safeguard is to insure that
the plea is voluntarily and understandingly made by the defendant. The
trial judge, before accepting the plea, should hear the evidence against
the accused and determine how likely a conviction will be. If the pro-
secutor is likely to sustain his case, the judge should then make abso-
lutely certain that the defendant fully understands the nature of the
charge against him, the consequences that may follow and, most im-
portantly, the fact that the recommendation of the prosecutor has no
binding effect upon the judge.52 As will later be developed, these
safeguards may not be as effective as would first appear.
The reasons why the accused will accept a plea bargain are also
varied. In some instances, the defendant will be afraid of antagonizing
the sentencing officials or possibly that his record will be held against
him by the jury.53 He may believe that the judge will be more severe
if subjected to a full scale trial5 4 Or the defendant may simply wish to
47. Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structures: Its Effect Upon Systems for the Admini-
stration of Criminal Justice, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 495, 500 (1958).
48. Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises By Prosecutors To Secure Guilty Pleas,
112 U. PA. L. REv. 965, 881 (1964).
49. Id. at 882.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 884.
53. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideration: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. Cmara.
L.C. & P.S. 780, 783 (1956).
54. Id.
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forgo all the embarrassment and inconvenience of -a protracted trial.
As uncontroversial as these reasons would seem, it must be noted that
they all would provide a similar inducement even if recommendations
had not been promised.
THE DANGERS OF PLEA BARGAINING
In reference to the above mentioned reasons it would appear that
plea bargaining will continue to be a powerful tool in alleviating our
over burdened courts. The process has been shown to be most effective,
and in the majority of cases will produce results that are both efficient
and justifiable. However, its limitations and dangers must be realized.55
One major danger associated with plea bargaining is the irreconcilable
results it sometimes gives. As was stated by one author:
Modern penal theory holds that the interests of both society and
the defendant are served by adjusting the sentence to reflect the
individual's prospects for rehabilitation. But when defendants
guilty of the same crime are awarded different sentences for admin-
istrative reasons, such a discrimination cannot be justified in terms
of individual culpability.56
This raises a critical question-who is receiving the benefits of plea
bargaining? It has been suggested that it is the recidivist because he
is better able to use his past experience to obtain a lighter sentence.57
In defense of this conclusion it could be argued that if anyone is en-
titled to the time and expense of a full trial, it must be the first offender.
For the experienced criminal this can often foster disrespect for the
effectiveness of the law.58
A principal purpose for long sentences in felony cases is to deter
persons from committing felonies. But when the seasoned criminal
knows that he will be permitted to plead to a lesser charge and get
a few months in the county jail, he may well conclude that it is
worth his while to commit the crime in face of such light punish-
ment.59
Even though some may argue that a criminal is rarely deterred by the
55. Id. at 789.
56. Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on the judicial Determination
of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 219-20 (1956).
57. Newman, supra note 53 at 790.
58. Id.
59. Dash; Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 IL. L. R v. 385, 395 (1951).
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possible consequences of his actions, the incongruity of a repeated
offender receiving a lighter sentence than the one or two time loser
still remains.
As with any process which can affect the destiny of another individual,
it is subject to misuse and exploitation. One such misuse which has
sprung from plea bargaining is the securing of a plea of guilty when the
State has a weak case, 60 i.e., where it is not likely that the evidence will
sustain a conviction. A number of situations may give rise to a weak
case. Crimes involving small or uncertain pecuniary amounts such as
larceny of second-hand items, lack of credibility of the state's witnesses,6 '
or inability to prove intent or premeditation in a homicide are a few
examples. 62 Realizing that a conviction would not be sustained, the
prosecutor might conceal his dilemma from the defendant and persuade
him to plead guilty.63 These procedures might, in many instances, be
used to place the criminal behind bars who because of a procedural
defect, or insufficient evidence, would otherwise be free. They may also
be used to incarcerate one who under the eyes of the law is innocent.
It is not suggested that these irreprehensible practices cannot be stopped
by the careful scrutiny of the trial and appellate judges. It is sub-
mitted, however, that real danger lies in overlooking these unethical
procedures in the name of a more efficient system of justice.
There is another danger inherent in plea bargaining which the most
elaborate and conscientious safeguarding may not prevent.64
60. Weintraub and Tough, Lesser Pleas Considered, 32 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 506, 513
(1941).
61. Id. at 513:
Since society brands drug addicts, prostitutes and persons with prior felony convic-
tions as notorious or immoral, they are considered poor risks as witnesses. [A]lso the
complainant who is reluctant to give testimony is of little value to the prosecution.
This type of complainant is likely to be so involved himself, that, on second thought,
he is anxious to have the indictment quashed; for example, a victim of a hold-up
in a house of prostitution.
62. See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 30-40 (1957).
63. Again, this may be accomplished by the prosecutor promising to make a recom-
mendation of leniency, or by intentionally drawing up more charges than the facts call
for and then offering to drop the unwarranted ones. Note that this latter tactic of the
prosecutor is specifically prohibited by the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY:
DR 7-103 Performing the Duty of Public Prosecutor or Other Government Lawyer.
(A) A public prosecutor or other governmental lawyer shall not institute or cause to
be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are
not supported by probable cause.
(B) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make
timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if he has no
counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other govern-
ment lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree
of the offense, or reduce the punishment.
64. This same danger is being confronted today in the area of confession of judgments.
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The concept of fairness and justice embodied in the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States is incom-
patible with the practice of permitting convictions based upon
guilty pleas not made voluntarily and no plea can be viewed as
voluntary that is produced of ignorance. 65
The United States Supreme Court has stated, as far back as 1897,
that a confession must be "free and voluntary; that is, it must not be
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct
or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any im-
proper influence." 6 More recently the Court has stated that the Bram
decision "did not hold that the possibly coercive impact of a promise
of leniency could not be dissipated by the presence and advice of coun-
sel. ' ' 67 Both the Supreme Courts of the United States and Pennsylvania
have made it clear that the two elements of understanding and volun-
tariness are requisite before a guilty plea may be accepted. 68 It is sub-
mitted that even with these safeguards being applied in good faith,
a certain element of unconscionability still exists.
The problem was first recognized in Pennsylvania in the 1930 case of
Commonwealth v. Patch.6 9 On an appeal before the Superior Court,
the defendant, charged with forgery, was induced to plead guilty by the
assurance of his attorney that sentence would be suspended and pro-
bation given. The accused at the time was painfully sick with duodenal
ulcers and hemorrhages, and as a result was interested in the quickest
solution available. Upon acceptance of his guilty plea, defendant was
sentenced to four to eight years in the Eastern Penitentiary. On appeal,
the plea was permitted to be withdrawn, "if it fairly appears that the
defendant was in ignorance of his rights and of the consequences of his
act, or was influenced unduly and improperly either by hope or fear
in the making of it, or if it appears that the plea was entered under
some mistake or misapprehension." 70 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
later renounced the "broad enunciation"7 ' of the Patch case but did
See Swarb v. Lenox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 991
(1971).
65. Commonwealth v. Myers, 423 Pa. 1, 5-6, 222 A.2d 918, 921 (1966). See also Machi-
broda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
66. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
67. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
68. - Commonwealth v. Rundel, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968); Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
69. 98 Pa. Super. 464 (1930).
70. Id. at 469.
71. Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 48, 55, 195 A.2d 338, 341 (1963).
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state that "the withdrawal of the plea of guilty should not be denied
in any case where it is apparent that the ends of Justice will be served
by permitting not guilty to be pleaded in its place." 72 In that case, the
defendant, Catherine Kirkland, pleaded guilty to murder on the assur-
ance of the assistant district attorney that a recommendation would be
made to the court at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence
that a sentence only be imposed for voluntary manslaughter. 3 She was
also advised by her counsel that although the judge was not bound to
follow the recommendation, "leniency was ordinarily extended to indi-
viduals of her age, extreme poor physical condition, and previous good
character and reputation."74 Despite the recommendation, the judge,
after hearing the evidence against her, found her guilty of second
degree murder and sentenced her to imprisonment from four to eight
years. On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the trial judge
"catechized" the accused in order to make certain she understood the
nature and effect of her plea.75 It then held that withdrawal of a plea
of guilty based upon misapprehension of material facts or of the law was
not justifiable where the defendant wished to change her plea merely
because her expectations as to the sentence were not realized.76 Although
Kirkland indicated a new hardline approach on the withdrawal of
guilty pleas after a bargain had been made, the case was distinguishable
in that the motion to withdraw was not made until after the sentence
had been given. Traditionally, the federal government has been less
likely to allow a post-sentence withdrawal than a pre-sentence with-
drawal .77
In Commonwealth v. Scoleri,7 8 the court held that although with-
drawal of a guilty plea was proper when "not made freely and volun-
tarily" or "where the plea was entered by mistake, ' 79 it was not legally
justifiable where it is entered "(a) under the belief that as a result of
72. Id.
73. Id. at 51, 195 A.2d at 339. Prosecutor admitted to defense counsel that there was not
sufficient evidence in his opinion to sustain a conviction for murder.
74. Id. at 53, 195 A.2d at 340.
75. Id. at 51, 195 A.2d at 339.
76. Id. at 56-57, 195 A.2d at 341-342. Accord, Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137,
151 A.2d 241 (1959); Commonwealth v. Banmiller, 193 Pa. Super. 411, 165 A.2d 121 (1960).
77. A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Pleas of Guilty:
§ 2.1(a)-The court should allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty ...
whenever the defendant, upon timely motion for withdrawal, proves that withdrawal
is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
§ 2.1(b)-Before sentence, the court in.its discretion may allow the defendant to
withdraw his plea for any .fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been sub-
stantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.
78. 415 Pa. 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964).
79. Id. at 247, 202 A.2d .at 536..
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such plea he will receive life imprisonment or lenient treatment, or
(b) where he and his lawyer had erroneously drawn the conclusion that
he will not receive a penalty of death or a severe penalty, or (c) where
his lawyer and the district attorney have agreed upon the exact crime
which he has committed and the penalty to be imposed .... ,80 Two"
years later it was decided that a defendant was entitled to a post-con-
viction hearing on the voluntariness of his plea where his counsel had
urged him to plead guilty, but never explained the consequences of
such a plea.8'
In 1970, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court laid to rest any ambiguity
about whether or not a court could deny a pre-sentence motion for
withdrawal. In Commonwealth v. Culbreath,s2 defendant pleaded
guilty to murder. Before sentencing Culbreath petitioned for leave to
withdraw his plea of guilty on the grounds that he was under a mis-
apprehension as to the sentence which was to be imposed. Defendant
pleaded not guilty at his arraignment, but before trial, defense counsel,
the prosecutor and the judge all met in chambers to discuss the fate of
Culbreath. He was later told by his counsel that if he pleaded guilty,
the assistant district attorney would recommend that he receive a maxi-
mum sentence of two years and that "the probabilities" were good
that the judge would follow it.83 The judge did not accept the recom-
mendation and sentenced him to from six to twelve years. The Supreme
Court upheld the decision for much the same reasons as in Kirkland.
We are convinced from the record that the defendant fully under-
stood the nature of the crime with which he was charged and his
rights, and the possible sentences which could be imposed and the
consequences of his guilty plea, and that his sole reason for attempt-
ing to have it withdrawn is his disappointment in the length of
sentence imposed.8 4
Justice Roberts dissented, expressing the federal philosophy that
a defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty before
sentencing if a fair and just reason is given for withdrawal.8 5
It is submitted that Pennsylvania is leading its defendants down a
dangerous road. Culbreath did what perhaps most people would do
80.. Id. at 248.
81. Commonwealth v. Myers, 423 Pa. 1, 222 A.2d 918 (1966). See also Commonwealth v.
Metz, 425 Pa. 188, 228 A.2d 229 (1967).
82. 489 Pa. 21, 264 A.2d 643 (1970).
83. Id. at 27, 264 A.2d at 645.
84. Id. at 28, 264 A.2d at 646.
85. Id. at 29, 264 A.2d at 647.
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in his position. First, he was asked whether or not he desired to plead
guilty to murder. He was told that the penalty for first degree murder
was death or life imprisonment. The penalty for the more likely finding
in his case, second degree murder, was imprisonment in solitary con-
finement for a term not to exceed twenty years. For manslaughter, the
term can run from three to twelve years. On the advice of his counsel,
and what he had seen transpire between his attorney, the prosecutor
and the judge, defendant pleaded guilty to murder. He pleaded guilty
not because he realized he had killed his victim with malice rather
than in the heat of passion, but because he was taking the best possible
alternative-a maximum of two years imprisonment. And yet the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated that he made his decision
voluntarily, and with no misapprehension. Would he have made this
decision so "voluntarily" if he had known what the outcome was to be?
The answer is obvious, but the court will not let him make his choice
from hindsight. It is difficult to believe that this is the same court which
in Commonwealth v. Evans"6 recognized the danger of a judge being
present during the discussion of a plea bargain, whether he participates
in the actual bargain or not. The conclusion of Justice Roberts aptly
states the pitfalls of not only the Culbreath decision, but the entire
process of plea bargaining.
Appellant was merely the victim of an admitted plea bargain which
he thought would bind the judge. Certainly it cannot matter that
the judge, unbeknownst to appellant, was not aware of the plea
bargain and was not in any way bound by the agreement. Such a
misunderstanding can occur easily and we should not penalize
appellant for it.87
CONCLUSION
It must again be stressed that plea bargaining is not a totally onerous
procedure. It is an effective answer to relieving our crowded courts.
The problems lie with the means to that end. It is this author's con-
tention that the most formidable problem is the failure to recognize
that dangers do exist. The courts must recognize that even though a
trial judge may not actually participate in the bargaining process, his
mere awareness of it may indicate to the defendant that he has acqui-
esced. This belief can remain despite any instructions to the contrary.
86. 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969).
87. Commonwealth v. Culbreath, 439 Pa. 21, 33-34, 264 A.2d 643, 649 (1970).
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They must be cognizant of dangers such as the irreconcilable results
and misuse to which plea bargaining is subject.
Most importantly, the courts must be honest with themselves in as-
sessing the true impact of plea bargaining in the voluntariness and
understanding of a guilty plea. As mentioned previously, the basic
premise of plea bargaining is that the defendant is guilty. If it is said
that the defendant is guilty because the trial judge has examined the
evidence and come to that conclusion from his knowledge of life and
the law, the decision he makes can be justified in the name of a more
efficient judical system. Even though our notions of due process may be
frustrated in the process, it might well be the price we must pay for a
society of two hundred million people. At least the courts would be
facing the real issue. But if it is said that the defendant is guilty be-
cause he has wisely and voluntarily chosen to plead that way, then
the courts have closed their eyes to the realities of human nature. They
have placed the judicial system upon a merry-go-round tempting all
who dare, innocent and guilty alike, to grab for the brass ring.
ROBERT W. MCCLURE
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